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POLITICAL GENERATIONS IN 
BUKOBA : 1890-1939. 
When .I first began my researches into Tang anyika 
colonial history, my aims were rather theoretical - namely, 
to camp are certain British id.eas of ":indirect rule" to the 
actual development of indigenous political and social 
dtructures under European domination . The following account 
of the Bukoba district during the 11 classical" period of 
colonialism began as a case study in one such development . 
In assembling my materials , however, I have found it diffic-
ult to relate the narrative of events to the original frame 
of reference . In fact, at my present stage of work , it 
remains very much a narrative and hardly at all an analystic 
exercise. 
What theoretical framework I have bee·n able to salvage 
is, as the title of my paper suggests, largely evolutionary. 
The "political generations" which I wish to distinguish in 
the various stag e s of colonial rule ar~ those Africans who 
were able to mediate spontaneously between the machinery 
of alien government and the outlook of the indigenous popu" 
lation. 
At the beginning of German rule in Bukoba, there was no 
such ·agency, and dealings between Europeans and Africans 
were carried out through the medium of intrigue and violenao. 
Ultimately, the Germans were able to come to an unde rstanding 
with both the .local African chiefs and the Catholic missiona 
aries both of whom performed the actual task of stimulating 
modernization in th e district, 
Under British rule, despite elaborate professions to 
the contrary, chiefs were deprived of the substance of 
their traditional power and coopted into the colonial bureau-
cracy, Even missionaries , in their key educational function, 
were absorbed into the same e stablishment . The only spont-
aneous intermediaries remaining were a group of partially 
educated political agitators , whose efforts to appeal against 
official compulsion in the name of both modern· European 
idea and popular African fe e ling achieve d only trivial or 
negative results. · 
The Bahaya* undoubtedly possessed the most highly 
developed traditional political syst~m in Tanganyika, and 
thus offer ~ very good case study for the relationship of 
such a system to colonial rul e . Ethnologically as well as 
geographically, their country belongs to the interlacustrine 
Bantu region, with institutions similar to those of Uganda, 
. Ruanda and Burundi . There are the usual divisions 
into royal ~ynasties, and pastoral and cultivator castes; 
the king s (called Bakama) are surrounded by a gre at deal of 
ritual and regalia, and receive administrative support from 
a heirarchy of sub-chiefs . This degree of organization as 
well as the ecolog ical luxury of a banana diet allowed the 
Bahaya to develop rudimentary e xchange economy , involving 
trade with ne ighboring territories in . such items as bark-
cloth and coff ~ e beans. 
• Bukoba district is named aft e r th~ Lake Victoria por t 
which constitutes it s administrative center, but its 
inhabitants are the Bahaya and the traditional name for 
their country is Buhaya. 
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Its near-conquest by B~ganda -in ~he la~~er nine teenth 
century emphasized th e r e l~tive weakne ss of Buhaya in the 
general inter-lacustrine context. All the Haya rul e rs, as 
well as their Zinza n e ighbors to the south and south e ast 
trace their origins to a single conqueror, th e semi-mythic-
al Ruhinda, who left Bunyoro sqmetime between the fourteenth 
and the eighteenth century. By the nine teenth century, 
however, the Hinda dynasty had split into a number of very 
disunited kingdoms. The Bazinza (about whom no more will 
be said in this paper) were divided between complete chaos 
in their eastern sector and a single stable kingdom . Rusubi, 
in the present Biharamulo district . Karagwe, the geograph-
ically largest of the Haya kingdcms and often regarded as 
something of a senior entity, had reached a peak of power 
in the late middle ~ineteenth century. But before the 
advent of the Germans , a seri ~ s of succession crises and 
the near annihilation of the cattle population through 
dis~ase had virtually destroyed the entire area . The six 
properly Haya kingdoms on the Lake coast were also affected 
by the loss of cattle , but more import9:ntly , the _weakening 
of the puro Hinda rulers had allowed the members of a closely 
related Rima (i. e . pastoralists , also originating in Bunyoro) 
family, the Bankongo, to usur p powe r in the largest of these 
kingdoms, Kiamtwara. A complex serie s of dynastic struggles 
h9:d attained, by the German advent , an unstable pattern in 
which the ancient Kiamtwara was divided into four kingdom~ 
Kiamtwara and Bugabo , ruled by Bankongo , and Bukara and 
Kianja, . still ruled by Bahinda. · 
One result of this instability was the failure of the 
Haya states to absorb any significant amount of foreign 
culture or technology previous to the establishment of 
colonial rule . The rountry was on the main trade and mission-
a~y route between the coast and Uganda, but Arab merchants 
appear to have made little impact and despite some ~ fforts 
by th e White Fathers in the 1880 's, no missionaries ever 
gained a foothold . 
There was thus little preparation for the aoming of 
the Germans nor was the initial interest of the latter in 
Buhaya anything more than pure colonialist "scrambling". 
T.he Emin Pasha expedition wa s despatche d from Dar-es-Salaam 
in 1890 to extend as far to the nort~west as possible the 
sphere of influence allowed to German East Africa under 
existing agr eements with Eng l and. 
As ix turned out, this sphere was delimited ~t one 
degree south lat ti tu~~ by an arbitrary agre e ment in Europe 
even before Emin Pasha r e ached Lake Victoria. Thus the 
expedition was l eft with the simple task of r e ducing the 
Haya rulers to submission. Despite the scientific and 
civilian backgrounds of Emin Paaha and his main lieutenant, 
Dr . Franz Stuhlmann (they were the only noD- militarists 
ever to be put in charge of Bukoba by the Germans) , they 
we~e - accompanied by a large military force undo ~ the more 
rugged Lieutenat Langheld which had already performe d 
impressively against Nyamwezi , Ngoni, Zinza and Arab oppon-
ents . The Haya, far less agree sive than these peopl e s, 
offered their would-be rul e rs to the direct resistance . 
Ihangiro, the southernmost of the Haya kingdoms, 
quickly signed a tre aty with the Germans and, b e cause of 
its remoteness from both European administration and the 
Bahinda-Bankongo riva~ry , was to remain rathe r on the fringe 
of political activity for the n ex t thirty years . Kahigi , 
the Hinda Mukama of th e southernmost Kiamtwara succ e ssor 
state also offe r e d allegiance unhesitating ly to the Germans 
and was to r emain their closest ally throughout their admini -
stration. In Bukara, th e smallest and weakest of the Kiam-
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the Europeans. 
But in the immediate vicinity of their chosen head-
quarters , the Germans did quickly become involved in the 
warfare of the two Bankone o, Mukotani of "lesser" Kiamtwara 
and Kayoza of Bugabo . Mukotani, whose kingdom actually 
included Bukoba, was the first to make frienas with the 
Germans and immediately received their support in retalia-
tion for an -attack from Bugabo . - whose Mukama thus also 
saw the value of submission. 
The most persistant res·i .stance to th·e Germans came from 
. Kiziba. This kingdom, becaus e of its close commercial ties 
with B~ganda (where Bahaya are to th~s day referred · to as 
11 Baz.iba11 ), already excelled its nei·ghbors in modern so-
phistication, but at the same time its aging Mukama Muta- · 
tembwa, believed that h e could rely on these northern ties 
. to fend.· off the Germanso However, the failure of any help 
t .o ,.materia:l:.ize .and· a show of strength by the Germans ·b-rought 
hir.1 to the point of also signing a treaty acknowledg.ing the 
11 proteoti"on 11 of the Germa.:1. e mperor (, 
The ease with which the Germans established themselves 
in Buhaya is illustrat e d by th eir subsequent ability to 
divide their forces: Emin P a sha himself moving off to 
adventures (and ultimat e death) in the farther reache~ 
of western Uganda and the Eastern Congo, another detach-
_ment returning to build a st a tion at Mwanza , while Langheld 
was left to supervise the actual construction of the Bukoba 
station. Langheld himself describes his policy towards 
the chiefs as " playing one off against the other11 , by which 
process he telt by th e ~ime h e handed the post over in 
1892, that· the German pre se nce had been firml.y established. 
The . instructi.ons -to this n ew Sta~i·onschef, Campagnie-
~hrer Herrmann, which were given ~tide publicity by the 
Dar-es-Salaam gove rnme:-1t; specified that he carry on Langheld's 
peaceful policie s a nd recognize .. the · n e cess·i ty for 11 a mediat- · 
ing - diplomatic rather than a dictatorial-military" role. 
In the next ten years of military a dminist-ration , the Germans 
can ·be said to have followed these instructions generally . 
All political as well as economic · quc stions wore to be a 
question of de aling with the chiefso As Hermann himself 
put it in an articl e of 1894: Indeed, the still prevailing 
principle "nothing wi thout t he permission of th e chief" is, 
after all, quit e comfortabl e for u s - one g ives orde~ to 
the chief, he commands his p e opl e to work, and there are no 
expenses" . 
However the Haya chi e fs were not yet quite ready 
to give up their tradi tio ;.1.al metho d s -of exe rcising and 
expanding their power, nor ~vould th e German commandants 
always e.xert . the ir .cont rol t h rough strictly diploma tic 
means . 
The elements of di s order in this .fir s t decade of 
German rule we r e thre e: th e e f f orts of the White Fathers 
to establish t h ems e lv e s s e cur~ly a mong th e Bahaya; the 
rivalry _ of the four Kiamtwar a succ e ssor kingdoms; and the 
conti·nued hos.tili ty of Kiziba to Ge rman demands . 
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The Emin Pasha expedition had already, on its way to 
Bukoba, made u s e of th e White Fa thers 1 station at Bukumbi, 
near Mwanza, both a s a resting place for its own personn~ l 
and an ag ency for th e r e settlement of rescued slaves . Thus, 
the Germans we r e quite willing to accommodate the Bishop of 
the Victoria Nya nza Vicariate, the Alsatian Msgr . Hirth , in 
his r e quest for a refuge from the persecutions and civil 
wars currently thre atening the Catholics in Ug anda . 
Both the White Fathers and the Military Station agreed 
that th e logical location for the new mission would be the 
territory of Mukotani, who appeared both a strong and a. 
cooperative ruler. A purcha s e of land in Kiamtwara was even 
arranged, but b e for e it could be securely occupied, the 
Europeans were to perceive for the first of many time s the 
principle that the hospitality of a chief to the missions 
fluctuated · in dire ct proportion to his s~nse of insecurity 
before the secular colonial authoriti e s . Mukotani, already 
supported by the military station, soon showed, by covert 
assaults upon the missi on, that he did not wish to follow 
the Bug anda example of allowing his traditional power to be 
undermined by Christi a n t e achings . 
In the end, it was Kayoz a of Bugabo who offered the 
missionaries land and promis~ of provisions and labor , 
perhap s because he hoped thus to r e verse his previous dis-
favor in German eye s, and more obviou s ly to procure reliable 
occupants for some territory which he had just won by military 
forc e from Kiamtwara. The first of these aims appears to 
have been frustrated~ howe ve r, as Kayoza soon also dispiayed 
dissatisfaction with his gu ests and Muko.t a ni's strength, in . 
the year s from 1893-1895, began to grow . The Germans even _ 
s e em to have supp ort e d him, at this p e riod, in his opposition 
to the missions. La ngheld, in Bukoba for a second tour , is 
r e ported by th e Whit e Fathers to have personally ej e cted 
one of t heir c a techists from Kiamtwara, possibly in connection 
With a supply of concubine s he is alleged to have r e oi e ved 
from Mukotani. 
In th e riv a lry ov e r tho control of 11 Gre ater" Kiamtwara, 
Mukctani, in 1894, scor e d an i mportant v ictory over his f e llow 
Munkongo, Kayoza, when his own c an dida t e , Kishebuka , succeeded 
to the puppet Bukara thron e . But from this point Mukotani, 
or his brother and chi e f a dvisor, th e warli~e Lwaijumba , seems 
to have b e come overconfi de nt and begun st e aling guns from 
the gove rnme nt soldi e rs, prob a bly for us c in a renewed attack 
upon Bugab o . The Ge rmans, aft e r :M:ukot a ni refused to return 
the weapons, quic k ly clos8d in on his c ap ital , the Mukama 
and Lwaijumba on l y just man agi ng to escape to Uganda . 
Another brother, Bwah ama, wa s p l a ced on the Kiamtwara throne , 
and the king dom stripp e d of fiv e sub-chi e fta~nci c s, four 
going t o Kahi g i of Ki a nj a , one to Bug abo, and a village e ach 
in Bug abo and Kiam'.; ·rrar a b ei ng a dde d to the White Fathers ' 
mission as ~'buffe r zon~ 11 • 
This inci de nt seems to h a v e s e t a pattern for intriques 
among the Ki amtwar a succ es sors, b e c ause six years later 
Kishebuka also fl e d to Uganda after the Germans had found 
guns hidden in his kingdom of Bukara. Kah igi again benefited, 
as all Bukara was divide d b e t ween Kianja and Kiamtwara . 
The unanimous e xplanation h e r e is that Kahigi actually planted 
the guns in Buka vu a nd then told tho Ge r mansthat Kishebuka 
had stole n th em, po s sibly out of pique at the latter ' s rew 
fusal to join him in a plot a gainst the Bankongo rul ers of 
Kiamtwara and Bugabo . Ev e n th e Ge r mans r e cogniz e d Kishebuka 1 s 
innoc e nce s e v e ral y ears late r. 
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One month after Kishebuka's flight, Bwahama of 
Kiamtwara rec e iv ed word that the Germans knew of guns 
hidden at his ~eadqu arters and he also fled to Uganda. 
There is still some c ontroversy among the Bahaya as to 
whether this c:targc was true~ and the Germans did not 
div ide any of the Kiamtwar a territory upoh appointing 
a new Mukamao Howeve r ·· the change was still again for 
Kahigi as the n ew ruler , Mun t u, was never in very strong 
favor with the Germans and shar ed Kuhigi's opposition to 
the missionarien. 
Bwa hama , had rece iv ed warning of his impending arrest 
from the then acting ruler of Xizi ba, 1.futahangarwa who 
remained unpu ni sh ed for this a c t , although his r ep r e sent-
ative at th e mil i tary station was ~~prisoned. This 
leniency on the pa~t of the German s indi ~ates the high 
regard they had for Mu tahangarwa, who was se cond in their 
favor only to Ka~ig i. He h ad risen to this position from 
an earlier stat e of open warfare wit:. t~e Germans and the 
chang e in his fortunes illustrates particularl y well the 
evolution of Germa!l rel a-:ic·!s w:. t~ tl--.e 'C 11. iefs. 
As already noted, Muta!1.angarwa 1 s father, Mutat embwa, 
had come into c onf lic t with t~e Germa~u f rom their earlies t 
arrival in Bukoba~ The Ki ziba s ources p~ace the blame for 
this on misunderstanding of Ge r man aims,inab i lity to mee t 
exorbitant t ribute dei!la.:::ld s , and a plo t by a second son of 
Mutatembwa, Lu shabula, to tu~n the Germans against the 
chos en heir, Mutahangarwao The German and missionary 
sources support most o f this, but add that M' ltatembwa 
continually r e fused to recognize German hegl(:;m ony and 
persecuted Chri Bt i ans~ 
The Ger:nan t reatme n·'j of KJ.zi'ba in ti-le se early years 
certainly shows thei r militar~sm in a parti cularly clumsy 
and brutal form . A series of o.tta·cks upon Mutatembwa ' s 
headquarters seems to have had little eff ec t on ~is or 
Mutahangarwa 1 s nega";i v c attitude . During a p lagu e epidemic 
in 1897, th e German medical officer de manded the corpses 
of victims for autopsyQ Vhen tae Baziba, re li eving this 
order to c onfirm t hei: fears of European cannibalism, 
refused to c omply : they were ordere d ~o send instead a 
court off,icial a:cd t he elde~ly p rime mir::. s te:.":' ( ka ti::iro) 
who volunteered fo:!..~ this :.1:.ssion was promptly hung . 
It was in t heir s upport of L · u~~- -::t'L- ·~:la that the Ge r-
mans finally re alized the ina ff ec t:vencs s of their 
methods . In 1898, Mut ete~bwa 'became so il l as to effec t-
ively c ease ~ul:;.ng Kiziba, Both the Germa:::1s c.nd the White 
Fathers f eared that his reacti on ary pol i cies would be con-
tinued if Mu t ah~n~ arwa were al lowed to take over . Againit 
the advice of the missionaries , ~ho realized that only 
civil war would result, the German commandant Von Richter 
decided to di vicle Ki z i -oa i:::1 Jcwo, giving the l arge r southe.r·n· 
half to Lusha'b ".J. la, who w<e..s proc laime<l !:Pr:.me Regent" . 
This at l east put an end t o Germa:::1 participa tion in . the 
fighting which cor. ~i :.-~t:ec 'b e ·cw3en the two b::-othe rs . It also 
gave them a c hnnce to juQge between them as l eader s among 
their own peopl e and ne8 otintors with the Europeans . 
Af~er l ess than two year s , L~ shabul a was reduced to the 
chieftainship of a single sub~region (even this was re-
moved in th e fol lowing year ) and Mutahangarwa declared 
legitimat e h e ir to a reunited Kiziba~ 
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The following year, 1901, in which Kishebuka and Bwahama 
were removed, marked the end of Richter's last tour in Bukoba, 
and with him, the completion of the fully militarist phase 
of German administration. Whatever their methods may have 
been, the Germans had established, by this time, an equili-
brium among the more troublesome chWfdoms which was to 
remain stable for the duration of their regime. The 
missions, if not particularly successful yet in their work , 
had at least maintained themselves ·on a politically neutral 
basis . And without too much attention to economic policy, 
the Germans . had already managed to stimulate the export of a 
certain amount of coffee from Bukoba. 
The decade and a half whi ch followed was to be the golden 
age of Haya chiefdom, with Kahigi and Mutahangarwa approaching 
a power which had probably never been equalled in any but the 
legendary past. Much of the credit for this must, of course, 
go to their own personalities . Both were forceful_ men, even 
ruthless at times, but able to live up to the traditional role 
of a Mukama while simaltaneously introducing their people to 
European institutions. · 
. But equally important for this success is the fact that 
the officer in charge of Bukoba from 1902 to 1916, Willibald 
von Stuemer, was singularly well -adapted to carry out the 
"diplomatic-mediating" policies which the Germans had so long 
advocated in this district . Despite his professional military 
background and u nquestioned courage on the occasion of actual 
combat, von Stuemer's personality and appearance believed 
utterly the stereotype of a Prussian martinet . Short, fat 
and jolly, he immediately won over the White Fathers; who 
found him, in contrast to the forbidding von Richter, "a 
charming companion, a man who enjoys life" . 
Von Stuemer's sociability, moreover, was not limited to 
his fellow ~uropeans . The White Fathers were even somewhat 
perturbed at his friendship with Kahigi, and African inform-
ants report that the two men were "like brothers". Mutahanga-
rwa was also on close terms with the commandant, as was his 
representative at the boma, Lwamgira. 
Neither von Stuemer's regime nor anything else could ever 
put a complete stop to the Bahayapenchant for fitina (intrigue), 
but until the First World War cr e ated new oppo~ities, suchplots 
as occurred did not at least occupy the center of political 
life. In those kingdoms which failed to settle down to stable 
rule, von Stuemer was able to deal summarily and effectively 
with the twists and turns of traditional power seeking. Kara-
gwe, which had been in perpetual crisis since 1880, was finally 
placed under the rule of Kiobya an uncle of Kahigi. In Bugabo, 
a ruler was dismissed simply because he could not put a stop 
to the plots of his rivals. The other dismissal of th e 
period, in Ihangiro , seems to have resulted simply from the 
refusal of the king to supply services demanded by the govern-
ment . There is speculation that von Stuemer even envisaged . 
some sort of paramountcy for Kahigi in Buhaya, but I have 
found no evidence for this. 
As the British were later to point out in critioisms, von 
Stuemer was able to supervise only the upper layer of this 
administrative system. Although he made extensive tours out-
side of Bukoba, informants report that he spoke only to the 
chiefs or to the people assembled en masse. In the latter 
case, he had to rely Swahili-speaking interpreters, because, 
despite his long service in Bukoba, he never mastered the Haya 
language . Von Stuemer usually took government troops along on 
his tours, but is said to have used them very seldom for 
" 
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coercive purposes . The real responsibility for internal 
order, as well as the enforc ement of such measures as 
coffee growing , lay with the Bakama , for which purpose 
their rugaruga (tribal police) were armed with carbines 
and drill ed annually in Bukoba . 
It may be quite true that , as the English were to insist, 
the lower leve ls of administration r e sulting from these con-
ditions were extremely sloppy and corrupt, chiefs h earing 
law case " in their houses over a gourd of beer" , and tax-
collectors buying their positions from chi efs as concessions 
for graft . However, it is difficult to imagin.e these 
function s carried out in any other way by the then existing 
cadres of the Bahaya . Von Stuemer ' s approach to these short-
comings was to support the development of an education system 
which would produce better functionaries in the fut~re . 
Here again, the task was essentially a · diplomatic 
one . The forc e s for introducing education on both a primary 
and advanced level had lbng been present in Buhaya in the 
form of the White Fathers' mission . However , until the 
time of von Stuemer, policies of a iding the mission had 
appeared to fit very badly with those of supporting the 
chiefs . 
This problem of a need for adminstrative personnel 
and inapility to make use of the missions had been encount-
ere d by the German East African government throughout mos t 
of its territory . The initial solution was to recruit staff 
from among the Muslim peoples of the coast , as these had a 
background of contact with alien institutions , could be 
further e ducated at the coastal centers of German government 
and already knew Swahili, the official language of native 
administration . The r sulti~g depradations practised upon 
interior tribal populatio~s by alien colonial servants -
both civil and military - h ave frequently been cited as the 
standard criticism of the German East African regime . 
Indeed, thd system had b~ e n attacked in the German legis-
lature as early as 1899 by Catholic partisans representing 
the interest-s of the missi_ons . The Dar - e s - Salaam secretariat 
caut e r-attacked by pointing out that missions only attracted 
tp.e "poo'r _and abandoned" members of African society. and attempt-
en to retain the best of them for th eir own work of prosy-
letization. The gove rnment would ove rcome its pre sent 
dependence on "intermediaries" by setting up schools of its 
own in the interior,· in which children 'of " the intelligent 
and influential" sector of the population would be t~ught to 
s erve their own people . 
The situation in Bukoba at this time conformed very 
closely to the government 's description . Most of the White 
Fathers' adherents con tinu e d to be Baganda , who had followed 
them into exile , and the few Bahaya drawn to th e mission 
were almost inevitably those of veiy poor political fortune . 
At no time in the Ge rman p eriod did a singlereigning chief 
accept so much as a d e athbed baptism and Mutahangarwa, with 
the full support of his e lders, disinherited ~ his · oldest 
and ablest son for refusing to give up Christi..8:nity . · 
The military station had also made several attem~ts to 
set up a government school , but with very limited sucdess . 
European teachers were compl e tely out of the question and even 
coastal Africans could only b e brought to such a remote area 
as Bukoba with great difficulty. 
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Von Stuemer set out to re~ers e this tr~hd in the first· 
months of his administration and by Septemb e r 1902 ·, had. pro-
cured an agre e ment with the Bakama of Bugabo and Kiziba, as 
well as the ruler of Rusubi, to assign specific plots of 
~and, including houses and banana plantations, for the use 
mission primary schools . Kahigi of Kianja remained ex-
cused from this obligation because his general cooperation 
with the mi litary station was accompanied by what von 
Stuemer call:ed "a holy apprehension" ( ein heiliges Scheu") 
of the missions . Muntu of Kiamtwara remained equally op~ 
posed , but here the commandant was willing to use the pree-
sure of threatened deposition so that in the next year Muntu 
agreed to give the missions even more land than had his 
colleagues . 
The actual standards of missionary teaching still 
remained unsatisfactory to von Stuemer, .but h e was subtle 
enough to combine his threats of sending Muslim . teachers to 
th e villag e s with promises of further support should the 
schools improve . That the situation still required delicate 
handling is illustrated by the chaos arou s ed during the 
latter part of 1903 by von Stuemer l s leave replacement, ' 
Oberlieutenant G8ring . As part of a general program of 
immediate and sweeping feforms, GBring r epeat e d in very 
strong terms the pre vious charg e s agains t the missionary 
schools . He also allowed himself to b e drawn into renewed 
intrigues by Muntu against the missionaries , who , it wa s 
claimed, had r e ceived far larger plots than was n e cessary 
for their schools. thus, r e nde"ring a numb e r of peasant s 
l andless . 
Von Stuemer , upon his return, took this situation into 
hand by a typ;i..cal set of compromises . The missi onari es we re 
assured of the conti nued support of their educational · enter-
prizes, bu~ enjoined to make a new agreement for th~ ~urchase 
of their land in Kiamtwara so as not to disturb th e position 
of th~ Mukama . The White Fath er s, who advocated instead 
a radical change in Buhaya land tenure and a general res - · 
trict;Lon of . the powers ·of the Bakama , saw this attitude as 
evidence of von Stuemer's "fe a r of making any enemies". 
Von Stueme r, at the same time , outline d his own determinatior.·a 
"to use the harsh monarchical constitution 
and the powe r of the sultans and sub- chiefs to 
educ a te their subj e cts, if nec essar y , by compul-
sion, for e conomic undertakings so long as th~ 
natives hav e not attained a cultural development 
in keeping with the interests of the coloni z ing 
power". 
This system did, in the remaining years of German 
administration, provide the results which i t h a4 s e t out to 
attai n . The energetic comman ds of the Bakama , partioularly 
Mutahangarwa , produced a very vigorous attendan c e at schools~ 
even allowing for the es tablishmen t of t wo high er schools 
in the district, ·o.ne by the mission and the other by the . 
government. The products of this educ a tional system were 
used by the ~ermans to promote higher standards of adminis-
t ration both in Bukoba and Ruanda-Urundi where many Baziba 
found employment . · 
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There i 's no space here to discuss in detail the 
economic developments - .mainly coffee ·production -which 
accompanied these more general reforms. The basic method, 
however, was again compulsion by the Bakama , who took 
great interest in both the quantity and the quality of 
their crops. When, later, the government provided agric-
ultural experts for the promotion of this effort , even 
the White Fathers began to cultivate coffee seriously. 
The outbreak of World War I found Bukoba remote from 
the oent.er of German power and strategic interests and 
threatened by superior British forces both in Uganda and 
on Lake Victoria. The impact -of the war seems also to 
hav.e been very parachial. Germa.n and British forces never 
engaged in any major land battles and even after an amphi-
bious raid from Uganda had destroyed the major German 
installations in Bukoba, the main inter.est of the Bahaya 
appears to have been focused on the subsequent arr e st of 
Mun tu fo~ p~undering the town. 
With little hope of holding back tbe expected British 
i -nvasion on his own front, von ·stuemer seems to have· direct ... 
ed his policies -towards keeping the district runn~ng smooth-
ly. Very few Bahaya were conscripted as either carriers or 
soldiers. Orders were given not to disturb Afri cans employ-
ed on European missions or plantations, including that of 
one British settler. When he finally did withdraw from 
the district in 1916, von Stuemer, who had always spoken well 
of the Br~tish, gave instructi6ns not to make trouble for 
the invaders, as the departing forces "wished to find the 
country in the same condition as they left it when they 
returned in three months time after the approaching German 
victory in Europe". 
To a great extent, the Bahaya displayed loyalty to 
their rulers during these first two years of the war . 
The chiefs freely contributed their rugaruga to the small 
force of · local troops ·and mobilized civilians . Lwamgira, 
Mutahangarwa's boma representative and by now von Stuemer's 
right hand man , was left, at one point, entirely in charge 
of the administrative headquarters. Later he and seve~al 
other African officials stayed with the·Germans through 
very heavy fighting against the Belgians on their retreat 
to Tabora. 
But the instabilities of war, abetted by the very 
active British intelligence servic u, offered the Bahaya 
an irresistable temptation ' t6 - reassert : thei~ traditional 
capacity for intrigue. · Apart from Muntu (whose actual 
guilt is debated to this daj), the Mukama df Bugabo was 
also suspected of treason, as was even Mutahangarwa. The 
Karagwe chief, Ntale, was actually caught communicating 
with the British and subsequently hung. 
When the Br.i ti sh finally did make their appearance 
in Bukoba in June 1916 they found the chiefdoms in an al-
ready acute state of flux which was ·accelerated by the first 
actions of the new regime . 
P e rhaps ·the most dramatic · alt"eration in the ,political 
structure did occur more by coincidence. than desi'gn, as, 
within ten weeks of the · German withdrawal, both Mu taha~a­
rwa and Kahigi died. The former had been seri·ously ill 
for some time with v e nereal disease and had made arrange-
menta for his succession with von Stuemer and Lwamgira. 
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However, with both of these abs ent; a bitter struggle 
developed . between factions supporting a Christian and a 
p ag an claimant to the throne, and the heritage of intrigue 
was to permanently undermine the position of the Kiziba 
monarchy . 
~ahigi, who had be e n particularly unhappy with the 
change of administration, is said, according to one version, 
to hav e c ommitted suicide when threatened with deposition 
by the British District Officer , D.L . Baines . Even, ifl 
as is more likely, the immediate cause of his death was 
disease and old age, h e also l e ft a weakened heritage . 
His chosen succ 0 ssor, Kalemera, wa s the son of a commoner 
mother and soon proved lacking in the courage n e cessary 
to deal with the inevitable plots on behalf of a more legi-
timately desc e nde d brother. 
The British themselves undertook the dismantling of 
Kahigi 's "paramountcy" by restoring to their thrones the 
legitimate heirs of Bukara and Karagwe . Both these rulers , 
. however , were boys still we ll in their minority, and r egencies 
had to b e _ established while they re ceived an education. 
In the confusion which followed Muntu of Kiamtwara~s . 
arr e st, his brother Lwaijumba had succeeded the throne with 
the g e neral acceptance of his subj ects. But this once for• 
midable warrior and intriguer was now both too old and too 
little educated to operat e effe ctive ly as a modern adminis-
trator . 
Of the t wo Bakama who ~id continue from pre-war time s, 
Rugachwa of Bugabo had always been weak , and at this stage 
developed epilepsy. Ruhinda of Ihangiro did display many 
of the characteristics of an abl e rul e r and ultimate ly prov• 
ed to be th e l eading p e rsonality among the Bakama of . Brit ish 
times . But h e too lacke d education and the remotene ss of 
his kingdom gave him an initial handicap in grasping modern 
affai rs. 
This weakene d state of the Bakama suit e d very well 
the p e rsonality of D.L. Baines, who was to remain in charge 
of Bukoba for over seven years . Although by profession a 
civil servant, Baines had dev e lop e d, during his sixteen 
years in the Uganda Provincial Administration , an author~ 
itarian character which contrasted sharply with the diplomacy 
of von Stuemer. In app e aranc e , Baine s was extreme ly tall 
and sturdyj and in manner , something of a bully . .Never-
theless , h e was an intelligent and effective administrator 
and the Bahaya, who are perhaps less adverse than other 
peoples to authoritarianism, r e member him with aff e ction. 
It is somewhat i~oni·c that such weakening of the tra-
ditional politic a l system of the Bahayashould occur at the 
hands of a British administrator fr~m Uganda . German govern-
ors and colonial secretari e s had long looke d upon Uganda as 
a general mo del for precisely the policy which von Stueme r 
had carr ied out in Bukoba, of working through th e traditional 
rulers . During the grea t debates about Tanganyika's adminis-
tr~ti ve system in the 1920 's, Baine s himself was to cite 
Lord Lugard's Dual Mandate in support of simila r ideas about 
using indigenous institutions as the foundation of colonial 
administration . · 
(> 
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The introduction of these ideas into Tanganyika 
and their general popularity in British colonial thought, 
however, coin~ide d with a stage in colonail history when 
by a process more of ev olutio~ than policy, the c e ntrally 
controlled bureaucracy was to increase its control over 
loc a l administr~tion . Thus , Lugard himself, in the y e ars 
around t~~ First World War, was berating his Northern 
Nigerian Re~idents for their trea tment of the Fulani 
Emirates as treaty stat es rather than administratively 
subordina te d native authorities e Se veral years af~er 
the war , the Uganda administrationwas to begin its inroads 
upon Buganda autonomy. 
In any cas e , wi th th ~ spontaneous d e cline of the Bahaya 
chiefs just at the advent of British rule th e proper analogy 
for these Baines years is perhaps less the conquest of the 
centraliz e d indigenous states of East or West African than 
the extension of administration to the more acephalous out-
lying regions of the Uganda Protectorate. In ·Bukoba , as in 
the former case, the British made ex t e nsive use of Baganda 
auxiliari e s and imposed GarJ.da models upon what app e ared 
generally similar political instittitions . 
In comparison with previous German policy, th e se Baganda 
in ·Tanganyika were neither as ubiquitous nor as seriously 
oppressive as the Swahilis . However, as the fully endorsed 
age.nts of Briti.sh political Ldeas and religious beliefs , they 
had _perhap~ a more ~a~~1ng effect in the undermining of 
traditional institutions. 
This effect is per~aps b es t illustrated in the area 
of religion. The Bahaya had always been abl e to perceive 
a very clear distinction b e ·'.:iwee n the Muslim Baswahili or 
the Catholic B~franza and the governing Abadaki (Germans). 
Abangre za , howev e r , had always meant to them both represent-
atives of British Uganda and Protestants, since the Angli c an 
Church Missionary Socie ty and its Baganda conv e rts had always 
been the sourc e for Pro tes tant prosyletization. Even the 
Luthe ran . mission whi c.h had been allowed to enter Bukoba by 
the Germans in 1910 depended for the ' little support it 
received upon Bahayawho had first been introduced to Chris t-
ianity ~hrough Uganda influe nceso 
Baines himse lf trusted the White Fathers even less 
than had the Germans, and h e lent early support to the 
installation of a C. M~S• mission in Bukobao Problems of 
personal forc~d the C. M.Se to · abandon Bukoba in 1924, but 
in these few years, the number of Prote stants in the dis -
trict had _climb ed from l es s than one hundred to over two 
thousand. Before the war, none of the Bakama had been 
baptized. By 1924, all were Christians four Protestant 
~nd thr.ee Catholic, • . 
Although Baine s, · in his official dealings, did maintain 
a strict neutrality b c twee·n the t wo missions·, h e made i ·t 
quite o~vious that he was in favour of some form of Christ-
ianity . The connection between this and his political 
policies is perhaps b e st illustrated by his first major 
decree of November 1916 when he announced both the reorgan-
ization of the chiefs' courts on the Ganda pattern and the 
abolition of various t+aditional institutions of inheritance , 
recruitment of children for the royal court, and all forms 
of sorcery and magic. The White Fathers, who had b ee n vainly 
fighting th ese same institutions since their arrival in 
Bukoba could only r emark, " Never did an act of the German 
government sound ~uch a Christian note". 
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The achievment for which Baines is b e st remembered 
among the Bahaya is his very forceful promwtion of increased 
coffee growing. While the Germans had made some progre ss 
in this area, the "scientific" policy of their latter years 
had emphasized research and planning rather than immediate 
production results . Baines, on the other hand, was faced 
with meeting enlarged expenses wi th temporarily reduced 
means . The strong chi efs who had help e'd promote:.coffee 
under the Germans we re : now gone . - ~oreove~~ th~ drop in 
coffee prices in 1917, along with a rise in the cost of 
textiles had convinced the Bahaya that the British - wh9 , 
had already introduced a number of diseases and large scale 
military conscription - were plotting to sacrifice their 
wealth to the Indian merchants . Baines was, at first , 
compelled to use very harsh corporal punishments along with 
frequent harranguing to convince the Bahaya to improve their 
cultivation. · Ev entually, he was abl e to temper this · 
policy by employing Francis X. Lwamgira (Mutahangarwa's 
former representative, now a lso a Christian), first as a 
political assistant and then, 'in 1921, as Native Insp e ctor 
of Agriculture. 
If Baines must be held directly responsible for the 
de struction of the Bakama ' s position, during the years of 
his owna&ninistration h e was at least able to offer his 
own vigonous intervention as a subst~tute for chi e ftaincy. 
None o~ his succ e ssors up to 1939 r emained in Bukoba for 
more than two tours (roughly fiv e years, _ minus six months , 
l eave) , · and most of ·them for an even· shorter time . As 
the personal ties on the local level weakened, the super-
vision from Dar- es- Salaam, particularly after 1928, when 
the Central Railway r eached Lake Victoria, became much 
closer . AgaiL~ this period of centralization coincides 
with an elaborate profession of government through indig-
enous institutions under the most famous disciple of Lord 
Lugard, Sir Donald Cameron. For Bukoba, the policies 
carried out under this program of "indirect rule" either 
furthered the decay of the chiefs ' positions or cameflagued 
this process with insignificant gimmicks. 
Thus, the first step taken by Came ron's administration 
w~s to conv e rt th e tributary payments to chi efs into an equi -
vilont salary·, to be paid out of a "Native Treasury" which 
would also allow local budgetary autonomy . In Buhaya, the 
authority of the chiefs, as well as their fiscal and judicial 
powe r, was to be enhanced by bringing their persons and re-
sourc e s together in a Bakama Council . · 
While the salaries did serve to maintain the older , 
chiefs at a very high standard of affluenc e , the local European 
administration showed its evaluation of th e contribution made 
by these rulers by reducing th e share each new succ e ssor was 
paid out of the Native Treasury. As a judicial appea·l body, 
the Bakama council probably worked fairly succ e ssfully. 
But the record of its deliberative s e ssions (in bad Swahili) 
indicates littl.e particip a tion in t he formulation of ·real . 
policy, the Council h~re serving mainly as a rost~um for 
European officers to announce their aims to the 6hiefs . An 
indication of the Bakama' s own feelings towards their rble 
in administration was their decision, when a new Council 
chamber was to be built, to have this outside the · town of . 
Bukoba where the present Bakama ~unlike the favored chi e fs 
of ~erman times) did not feel "at home" . 
- 13 -
The major economi c policy of ~he inter-war period 
continued to b e the production of ~offee, with a gradual 
return to the empha::: is on scientific control of quality. 
In 1937, after some passive resistance by the Bakama, the 
administration c onvi nc ed them to accept a new set of regula-
tions for the inspe ction and improyement of the coffee crop . 
The chief s had doubtlessly realized that these rules would 
be extremely unpopular among the Bahaya, who feared them as 
a threat to both their property rights and their much valued 
l ~i sure . Whether the Bakama continued their resistance by 
not explaining th e rul es to their subjects, or had simply 
lost the influenc e to bring about such changes, the attempt 
by agricultural offic e rs to e nforce the rules led to serious 
rioting throughout the district and the reforms had to be 
abandoned . 
In educational policy, the _two aims of the indirect _ 
rule era were to adapt the ~ubstance of school curriculum 
to "African" conditions and to coordinate t~e efforts ~f 
Government , missions and native authorities. The only 
intensive effort to promote "-adapted" education among the 
Bahaya was made by W. B . Mumford in the early· 1920 ' s , but 
the African reaction to his policy. of promot:i.ng the teach-
ing of arts and crafts was simply mistrust , and his succes-
sor reverted to more othodox practices . 
The substance of cooperation between differ e nt bodies 
involved in e ducation was to be that the gove rnment would 
give material subsidies to schools run by eit~er the m~s- · 
sions or the native authorities . The original decision 
as for such coop eration b e tween missions and government had 
been made in 1925 by a committ ee of various experts meeting 
in the Colonial . Office and continuing to formulate doctrines 
on the type of e ducation needed in Africa and similar places . 
A parallel "Advi~ory Committee on Education" was to mee t in 
each colonial capit a l, and in Tanganyika, at·least, Pro-
vincial Educational Committe es were also e stablished. Such 
a committe e did mee t a numb e r of times in Bukoba between 
1£28 and 1931, bringing together government officials·, 
missionaries and chiefs , but again , littl e of substanc e 
appears to have transpired. The granting _of subsidies 
cert 8 inly brought the missionary effort into even closer 
identification with government, which now exercized an 
e v e r-growing control over the curriculum of their schools ~ 
The native authority schools apart from b ei ng financed 
mainly from local funds, never differed in any way from 
regular goverment institutions. 
On the more g neral cultural issues of social cohesi on 
and morality, which had become major cris e s in Bukoba by 
the. 1930's, the Bakama proved very little help . On the 
contrary, three of the younger and more eduoated chiefs , 
Rumanyika of Karagw~, Mutakub wa of Kiziba and Lutalemwa 
of . Bugabo prov e d so dissolute in their personal behavior 
that between 1937 and 1940, all of them had to be sacked. 
The polit ical picture which emerges from the above 
analysis of official policy and the role of the chie fs 
during the first phase of British rule in Bukoba is virt -
ually a blank. To understand what forc e s actually kept 
the governmental machinery in touch wi th the Bahaya during 
this period and to seek some element of response to European 
policies, it is n e c essary to lo ok beyond the chiefs to more 
poorly documented activities of the still very small educat -
ed elite . 
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Such an element was rare in the up-country areas of 
Tanganyika during the 1920's and 1930's and its existence 
in Bukoba can be traced directly to the previously strong 
position of t h e chiefs . The few men who dominated native 
administration, economic enterprize , and popular agitation 
d~ring these years had all received their education in 
German times and were inevitably connected to the families 
and courts of the Bakama . They tended also t o come from 
those kingdoms closest to Bukoba and most cooperative 
with government programs, particularly Kizib~ . All had 
been influenced by new religious forces, most ly Catholic 
(but in one important instance, even Islam), although they 
still professed a strong allegiance to the Bakama. 
The most successful of those new elites were those 
who threw in their lot with the government, particularly 
in the Native Administration. The outstanding example h ere 
is Francis X. Lwamgira , who , from 1925 to 1945 acted as 
secretary to the Bakama Council and is sometimes referred 
to as the "Kirig of Buhaya" . 
As alr ady noted, both von Stuemer and Baines had 
placed a great deal of reliance upon Lwamgira, and his 
po.si tion grew even stronger with the turnover of adminis-
trators whi ch followed them . Given the weakness of the 
Bakama and their penchant for intrigue , it is obviously 
Lwamgira who must be credit e d with the smoothness which 
prevailed throughout the administrati?e changes of these 
years . But when judged in political rather than adminis-
trative terms, Lwamgira ' s role seems far more circumscrib-
ed . Because of his innocence of any ambition for self-
aggrandizememt and his great outward deference toward the 
Bakama , he was able to maintain the general confidence 
of the Behaya . But in moments of crisis, it is obvious 
that they did consider him to be essentially· a servant 
of the Europeans. 
Thus, in 1921 Lwamgira was. chosen by the Dar-es-Salaam 
secreta~iat to represent Tanganyika native views at a Joint 
Parliamentary h earing on East African Closer Union . In 
fact, there was little controversial about this, as the 
government shared the fear of Africans that any move toward 
political union would allow Kenya settlers to undermine 
existing native policies. However, the Bahaya were sur-· 
ficiently convinced that Lwamgira would present the govern-
ment 1· s rather thai). their own views that they supported the 
Bakama in efforts to present their own views directly to 
London. 
Again, in 1937, Lwamgira attempted to uphold th e 
government 's new coffee rules with such conspicuous lack of 
success that on one occasion he was stoned by a mob . Sub-
sequently, he formed an Agricultural Association to promote 
more progressive cultivation among an enlightened minority , 
but despite an impressive membership list, this effort too 
failed to alter the thinking of the Bahaya. 
Early in 1924, a small group of educated Bahaya 
announced the formation of an organizatiori "for the develop-
ment of our country and for the seeking of a system for the . 
simple way to civilization, to our mutual adv~ntage". This 
Bukoba Bahaya Union stressed repeatedly its interestin 
"progress" and 11 civilization" and disclaimed all involvement 
in politics. In thode efforts it even receive~ the sanction 
of the administration, which allowed it a site in Bukoba 
township and acquiesced in some of its demands for the elimi-
nation of minor abuses, such as the enforced saluting of 
Europeans in public places. 
( 
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This organization took on a somewhat wider ori e ntation 
in the 1930 1 s when, during the heightened awareness of the 
Clos e r Union cont roversy, it affiliated with the Dar-es-
Salaam Tanganyika African Association. In Bukoba itself, 
its activiti e s became somewhat more controversial. Herbert 
Rugazibwa, a leading member of the organization was fired 
from his cl e rkship in the Bakama Council for protesting 
directly to the Governor against the conversion of the Bukoba 
Gove rnment Central School into an agricultural training 
center . Another leader, Kl eme ns Kiiza, became involved in 
a rather acrimonious suit against the White Fathers ' mission 
by some of its peasant tenants. Finally, in the 1937 coffee 
riots, the African Association (as it was by now c~led) 
was strongly suspected of having helped organize the re-
sistence to the government and went into a hibernation from 
which it did not arise until after the Second World War . 
The aims of this Bahaya Union African Association were 
unque stionably highly confused. At one time · they advooated 
consolidating the power of the Bakama into a paramountcy, 
in other inst ances they opposed some of the Bakama ' s tradi-
tional p rerogatives . They advocated progress and civilization, 
but refuse d to support the government in its r e forms of 
coffeetnronuctf'on . The ~over~mett as well ~sthc ~akama t~nde d 
'to ~rl :'lClZ e t c .org1fl.nlZ .'tlon s cacte rs as .seml- ctuca-c.ed and ·unrepresen atlve' • ·evertne ess, ln ;;nelr ef or-cs 'to. 
express some of the responses of the Bahaya to colonial 
administration, the y must be considered the only truly 
"pc.li t i o al" e len:ent of this period. Government policies had 
anticipated any major programs of rational change which 
could be advocat e d at this time, but in doing so , they had 
destroyed all the means for spontaneous communication between 
rulers and ruled other than that of prot e st for its own sake . 
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BUHJ~YA KE-:GDC1;3 A:lll RULiRS 
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